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 “To some, history (including evolution) is not a 
science, because its results cannot be replicated and 
thus cannot be tested by the experimental method”, 
Cavalli-Sforza (2000, p. VIII) 
 
“The Neolithic revolution (…) has to be presented as 
a single event because archaeology can only 
recognize the result: the several steps leading up 
thereto are beyond the range of direct observation” 
(Childe, 1951, p. 87). 
 
Testing causal relationships expressed by mathematical models on facts about human 
behaviour across history is challenging. A prominent example is the Neolithic 
agricultural revolution [1]. Many theoretical models of the adoption of agriculture has 
been put forward [2] but none has been tested. The only exception is [3], that uses a 
computational approach with agent-based simulations of evolutionary games. Here, we 
propose two games that resemble the conditions of human societies before and after the 
agricultural revolution. The agricultural revolution is modelled as an exogenous shock 
in the lab (n=180, 60 independent groups), and the transition from foraging to farming 
results from an equilibrium selection process decided by experimental subjects. The 
experimental data replicate the known facts that foragers organized themselves around 
division of labour [4] and were more egalitarian than farmers [5]. There is also evidence 
of bi-modal distribution along the foraging-farming axis with many in-between groups 
[6, 7, 8]. These results provide direct evidence that the modes of production determine 
the system of values of societies (inequality) and lend support for the idea that human 
moved in a widespread manner from foraging to farming societies. We also find that 
cultural and institutional preconditions were crucial for farming [9], as more egalitarian 
foraging groups adopted earlier agricultural techniques, but inequality raises in farming 
societies as agriculture settles [10], with the long run success of agriculture being 
determined by the land-owner’s legitimacy. These results enrich our understanding of 
the Neolithic agricultural revolution and highlight the relevance of experimental 
methodology to generate a rich dataset that complements the fragmented evidence from 
archaeological sites. 
JEL codes. C72, C92, D02, D31, D70, N00, N50, O33, P14, Z13 
Keywords. Inequality, agricultural revolution, foragers societies, farming societies, 
property rights, land-owner, human values, experimental economics 
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A long run analysis of economic inequality is necessary to better understand its 
historical causes [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16], but the deeper we delve into history, written 
records disappear and we must rely on archaeological evidence [5, 10, 17]. The 
fragmented archaeological evidence does not allow for the causality analysis required to 
assess the influence of technologies -as it is the tradition in economics, [18]- and 
institutions -as it is the tradition in history, [19]- on economic inequality.  
To handle the causality analysis, some researchers have used mathematical models. 
Agriculture has been considered “the first economic revolution” [20], and the starting 
point to the increase in inequality [1], thus a great deal of attention has been directed 
towards understanding the prehistoric shift from foraging to farming societies. In 
economics, this shift has been modelled using growth theory and technological change, 
i.e. superior labour productivity in farming over hunting (see [2] for a survey of 
economic explanations of the agricultural revolution).  
Can a causal explanation expressed by a mathematical model about facts than happened 
ten thousand years ago be tested? Some researches [4, 21, 22] use a computational 
approach and run agent-based simulations of evolutionary games to test their prediction 
of the co-evolution of the adoption of a new technology (farming) and the arrival of a 
new institution (land private property) (see also [23]). In this paper, we advocate an 
alternative avenue: the experimental methodology. We show that the experimental 
methodology has the potential to contribute to the debate on the causes of inequality in 
human history. We attempt to test a long-standing question about whether the modes of 
production determine the value system of societies –particularly the levels of inequality. 
This idea already present in Marxism [24, 25, 26] has been recently revitalized [27]. 
The basic claim in [27] is that foraging societies were more egalitarian than foraging 
societies, because of the differences in the modes of production. He shows a positive 
correlation between the modes of production (as measured by the percentage of GDP 
from non-agricultural sectors) and value systems (proxied by a measure from the World 
Value Survey of the relative predominance of traditional versus secular values). Some 
authors, however, conclude that this approach “is not theoretically well-grounded nor 
empirically documented” [28] (pg. 1133) because this correlation does not imply 
causality. In addition, there are alternative causal mechanisms, as differences in value 
systems (in particular, the level of inequality) can be explained by growing population 
sizes [29].	
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The above criticisms can be easily addressed by the experimental methodology. We 
design an experiment that captures the conditions under which the agricultural 
revolution took place. We have 40 independent groups of three members each, with a 
total n=120 (n=180, 60 independent groups, including a robustness treatment). The 
experimental design comprises two blocks of twenty rounds where subjects face two 
non-cooperative games that represent foraging societies (“hunt-gather” game) and 
farming societies (“hunt-farm” game). In each round of each game, experimental 
subjects first choose unilaterally which economic activity to engage in and they receive 
earnings depending on their choices and the choices of the other members in their 
group. Then, they decide how to redistribute their earnings between themselves and the 
other members of the group in a redistribution stage. In both games, there are two 
equilibrium configurations matching what is known about the prevalent economic 
behaviour of both foragers, egalitarian societies with social division of labour [30], and 
farmers, more unequal societies concentrated on land use [16]. Hence, the transition 
from foraging to farming is an equilibrium selection process decided by experimental 
subjects, because they make choices about the prevalent mode of production (i.e., the 
economic activities predominantly chosen within a group) and the value system (i.e., 
how the earnings are distributed among the members of the group). 
The agricultural revolution is modelled as an unexpected exogenous technological 
shock that happens between the end of the twenty repetitions of the “hunt-gather” game 
and the beginning of the twenty repetitions of the “hunt-farm” game. Acknowledging 
previous contributions [3, 22, 31], we impose uncontested property rights and assign the 
land to the member of the group that gathered most in the “hunt-gather” game. This 
member will become the landowner for the twenty repetitions of the “hunt-farm” game, 
and in each round, he receives the totality of earnings from farming activities, although 
redistribution is always available in the redistribution stage. 
The experiment reproduces the basic facts about the Neolithic agricultural revolution 
known from archaeological and ethnographic studies. In the “hunt-gather” game, the 
modal economic system is based on social division of labour. Once farming techniques 
were available and land ownership was assigned to one group member, there is a 
significant drop in social division of labour from 37% to 18% and we observe a clear 
shift towards the other equilibrium outcome, farming activities, from 21% to 56%. As 
for the level of inequality, the median Gini index in the “hunt-gather” game is 
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significantly smaller than in the “hunt-farm” game (0.053 vs 0.284). These findings 
provide empirical evidence of a direct causal relationship between the modes of 
production and the level of inequality. Quite interestingly, our results suggest also that 
the agricultural revolution was not a smooth uniform process. If we compute the 
percentage of periods that groups farmed the land in the “hunt-farm” game, we obtain a 
bimodal distribution, with around 50% of groups in the extremes of the distribution: 
20% of the groups never experienced the agricultural revolution and 30% of the groups 
nearly farmed all the periods. In-between, there are groups with short and long lasting 
agricultural experiences. This result is in line with the hypothesis that groups were 
heterogeneous when moving from foraging to farming societies ([6, 7, 8]. 
But the lab also offers new insights into the agricultural revolution. One key element of 
the design is that the group composition remains unaltered across games. Given that the 
transition from foraging to farming is an equilibrium selection process, this feature 
allows institutions and shared norms developed by groups in the “hunt-gather” game to 
determine the adoption of agriculture, as has been postulated in archaeology [9]. The 
experimental data offers some results on this account. Experimental foraging groups can 
be described by their prevalent economic system and by their redistributive efforts. We 
find that the more egalitarian groups are in the social division of labour, the more likely 
they are to quickly adopt agriculture. The long-term survival of agricultural practices, 
however, seems to depend on the legitimacy of the land-owner. Finally, once farming 
has been stablished as the stable economic activity in a group, the experimental data 
shows raising inequality, revealing that the hierarchical structure of farming groups, 
with a landowner and two peasants, has a natural tendency towards inequality; i.e., our 
data suggest that the advent of farming did not create inequality in the short-run but this 
was the result in the long-run in farming societies with long-lasting experience.  
 
Bringing the Neolithic revolution to the lab. Experimental design 
In the experimental sessions, subjects were matched in groups of three members and 
participated in two blocks of 20 rounds each. Each round had two phases: a decision 
stage and a redistribution stage. In the decision stage, subjects chose between two 
economic activities that paid off differently depending on their choices and the choices 
of other members in their group (see below). Subjects received feedback on the choices 
and payoffs of all members in their group before proceeding to the redistribution stage, 
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in which they could make transfers to other members, i.e. subjects could give up any 
part of their payoff to increase the payoff of any other member in their group. The value 
system (i.e., the level of inequality) results then from subjects’ choices.  
At the end of each round, subjects got to know about the final payoffs of all members 
before moving to the next round. A history table, containing for each past round 
information about the action profile chosen by the group and the payoff to each 
economic activity, was also available at the end of each round.  
Block I (rounds 1-20) represents the functioning of foraging societies, where the two 
main economic activities are hunting and gathering. Once Block I finishes, we change 
the strategic interaction within groups to model the Neolithic agricultural revolution 
[32]. Block II (rounds 21-40) then represents the functioning of farming societies, 
where the two main economic activities are hunting and farming. When subjects 
participated in the first block of the experiment they knew there existed a second block, 
but the details were not disclosed after the first block was played. We kept constant the 
composition of the groups across rounds and blocks; i.e., we rely on a partner-matching 
protocol. This is to allow the shared values or norms developed within groups in Block I 
to influence the behaviour in Block II [9, 33]. 
 
Foraging societies 
Table 1 displays the payoff parameterization of the “hunt-gather” game that subjects 
played during the decision stage in Block I. The payoffs are based on ethnographic 
studies that compute the average productivity of hunting and gathering (measured in 
caloric gain per hour) in three modern foraging societies, namely the Ache of Paraguay 
[34], the Hazda of Tanzania [35] and the Hiwi of Venezuela [36]. These studies reveal 
two stylized facts: (i) (sexual) division of labour and (ii) larger productivity of hunting 
relative to gathering, although the returns from hunting are less predictable than those 
from gathering. For a discussion of this literature, see [37]. The data on the large 
productivity of hunting relative to gathering comes mainly from large game or large 
pray hunting. 
In our setting, action A (“gathering”) yields a secure payoff of 20 while the payoffs of 
action B (“hunting”) depend upon the size of the hunting group and reach a maximum 
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of 50 when there is division of labour and two out of the three members of the groups 
decide to hunt together.1 
Table 1. Experimental payoffs depending on the action of the other two members in the 
group in Block I 
 
Foraging societies Action of others 
Block I (hunt-gather game) BB AB AA 
Action A (Gathering) 20 20 20 
Action B (Hunting) 10 50 0 
 
In the hunt-gather game, there are 4 different earning outcomes, (20, 20, 20), (20, 20, 0), 
(20, 50, 50) and (10, 10, 10), associated to 0, 1, 2 and 3 hunters respectively. Two of 
these outcomes are egalitarian, corresponding to the symmetric profile in which all 
members choose gathering (AAA) and all members go hunting (BBB). The asymmetric 
profiles in which there is division of labour (AAB and ABB) yield unequal payoffs. 
Under selfish preferences, in equilibrium, there will be no transfers in the redistribution 
stage, hence the game has two classes of (subgame perfect) equilibria in pure strategies: 
one egalitarian and another unequal.2 The first class contains the symmetric profile 
AAA, and it corresponds to a foraging group in which all three members of the group 
gather. This outcome does not maximize the earnings of the group but payoffs are 
equally distributed (20, 20, 20). The second class contains three asymmetric equilibria 
with social division of labour (ABB), where one member gathers and the other two 
hunt. This profile maximizes the earnings of the group (efficient outcome) although it 
implies a unequal distribution of payoffs (20, 50, 50), because under this profile, 
hunting is more productive than gathering. This second class of Nash equilibria captures 
the above-mentioned stylized features of the foraging societies: social division of labour 
with returns from hunting larger, but more uncertain, than returns from gathering.3 
																																																						
1 Large pray hunting intuitively yields the concavity of the payoffs from hunting. Let assume that the 
value of the prey is V, the probability that a solo man kills the prey is p and the expected cost from 
hunting to a solo hunter is c. The probability 𝑝 𝑛  that a group of 𝑛 hunters kills the prey is 𝑝 𝑛 = 1 −1 − 𝑝 & and the individual expected payoffs to a hunter in a group of 𝑛 hunters is 𝜋 𝑛 = 𝑝 𝑛 (& − )&. 
While the probability 𝑝 𝑛  is increasing in the group size 𝑛, individual payoffs from hunting are not, 
because the larger the group, the smaller the fraction of the prey that is allocated to each group member. 
Therefore, individual payoffs from hunting are concave, implying that there exists a group size n* after 
which individual payoffs from hunting start to decline. 	
2 There are also two symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria in which subjects gather with probability 0.1507 
and 0.7382 respectively. 
3 Payoffs are uncertain because of the coordination problem inherent to the action profile ABB. Recall 
that there are three equivalent Nash equilibria all with one gatherer and two hunters. Hence, the group has 
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Even if an action profile yields an asymmetric distribution of payoffs, subjects had the 
opportunity to redistribute earnings during the redistribution stage. Hence, the game 
allows a group with social division of labour to end up with a fully egalitarian outcome. 
 
Farming societies 
We model the agricultural revolution as a technological change. Earnings from action B 
(“hunting”) are the same as in Block I, but earnings from action A (“farming”) change. 
There is evidence that at the beginning of the agricultural revolution, foraging was as 
productive as farming was [39], although later on, the more favourable climate 
conditions [40, 41] and the development of better cropping techniques increased the 
land productivity [42]. This allowed farmers to increase the capture of energy by a 
factor of 4 or 5 [27, 43]. To incorporate this fact, we assume that earnings from action A 
depend upon the “quality of land”. At the beginning of Block II (round 21), the land is 
of low-quality and produces exactly the same earnings as the most efficient allocation in 
foraging societies (120). Earnings from farming are increased up to 480 (i.e., by a factor 
of 4) when the land is of high-quality. In order to assure a high-quality land in the next 
round, an investment of 120 points is required in the previous round. This implies that 
jumping from low to high-quality land in the short-run comes at the cost of having no 
earnings today, as the total earnings from farming a low-quality land (120) is to be 
invested. These features imply that farming had no immediate benefits [39] or that the 
transition to agriculture required huge effort by members of the group [42, 44].4  
Another key element of the agricultural revolution concerns the existence of property 
rights, which are absent in foraging societies [3, 45, 46, 47]. To assign property rights, 
we rely on the idea that labour and effort lead to an innate psychological claim, thereby 
affecting the emergence of (and respect for) property rights [31]. This translates into 
considering that the subject who chose action A “gathering” more frequently in Block I 
becomes the landowner in Block II. The landowner receives all the earnings from 
farming after the decision stage and has to decide how to redistribute them in the 
redistribution stage. The landowner decides also whether to invest 120 points in 
																																																																																																																																																														
to coordinate on who will be the gatherer. This, in turn, implies that cooperation may not occur due to 
coordination problems [38] 
4 The experimental design strengthens this fact as we paid one round of each block at random to 
experimental subjects. Thus, subjects who invested the 120 points to change the quality of the land would 
give up their earnings of Block II if this round were selected for payment. 	
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securing a high-quality land in the next round. The investment decision is done before 
the redistribution stage. Table 2 below displays the experimental payoffs in Block II. 
 
Table 2. Experimental payoffs depending on the actions of others in the group in Block 
II 
Farming societies Actions of others 
Block II (hunt-farm game) BB AB AA 
Action A* (Farming Low-quality land) 20 70 120 
Action A* (Farming High-quality land) 40 240 480 
Action B   (Hunting) 10 50 0 
* Payoffs from action A in Block II are allocated to the landowner, who can redistribute them during the 
redistribution stage. The landowner needs to allocate 120 points to land investment in order to benefit from High-
quality land next round.  
 
Under selfish preferences, in equilibrium, there will no transfers in the redistribution 
stage, hence the hunt-farm game in Block II has the same two classes of (subgame 
perfect) Nash equilibria in pure strategies as the hunt-gather game in Block I: AAA and 
ABB. In the foraging equilibrium, ABB, the farmer earns 20 and each of the two 
hunters earn 50. In the farming equilibrium, AAA, the landowner keeps all earnings 
form farming (120) and peasants gets no earnings. In addition, there is no investment to 
enhance the quality of land in equilibrium, thus the increase in productivity does not 
lead to the farming outcome [23].  
 
Experimental Methods 
We run two experimental sessions at the Laboratory for Experimental and Behavioural 
Economics LINEEX (Valencia) in 2018 and 2019. We recruited a total of 120 subjects 
to participate in our computerized sessions [48]. An additional treatment with 20 groups 
(60 subjects) was run for robustness. Payoffs in the experiment were presented in terms 
of points and then converted into euros at the end of each session (10 points = 1 euro). 
The average duration of each session was 90 min and the average payoff was 17 euros 
(we paid out one round of each block at random). At the end of the experiment, and 
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while experimental subjects waited to be paid, we used a questionnaire to collect their 
gender, age, risk attitudes, and trusting behaviour.5  
 
Replicating the basic facts of the Neolithic revolution in the lab 
In this section, we provide evidence that the main results of the Neolithic revolution can 
be observed in our experimental data. We first focus on the modes of production and the 
level of economic inequality in each block of the experiment. Then we analyse the 
transition from foraging to farming societies.  
 
Modes of production and economic inequality 
Panel A in Figure 1 displays the evolution of the action profiles across rounds, labelling 
those that correspond to the equilibrium outcomes AAA (all gathering/farming) and 
ABB (division of labour).6 We measure the wealth of subjects using their (total) 
earnings in each of the two blocks. Panel B in Figure 2 displays the Gini using a box 
plot.7  
Table 3 summarizes the choices of subjects during the two blocks of the experiment. 
This includes information on the frequency of rounds that groups played in the low and 
high-quality land and presents the median Gini index in each block.  
 
 
 
																																																						
5 We measure risk aversion using the investment game in [49], while we measure trusting behaviour as in 
the General Social Survey [50], using the question “Generally speaking, Do you think that most people 
can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?” 
6 We observe that in both blocks, choices settle after a few rounds, suggesting a quite stable distribution 
across rounds. Appendix A contains econometric estimates of the transition probabilities from and to the 
different action profiles at the group level, which illustrate the equilibrium nature of the profiles AAA and 
ABB. This also contains a detailed analysis of the propensity to choose action A at the individual level. In 
line with our theory, we observe that risk aversion predicts this choice as subjects who are more risk 
averse are more likely to gather in Block I.   
7	The Gini index takes the value 0 if all members in the group earned the same amount, while a Gini index 
that takes the value 1 implies that all earnings of the group are concentrated in one member. Our approach 
follows the methodology in [5] who examine the disparities of wealth inequality across societies using the 
Gini index. They authors compare this index in foraging, horticultural and agricultural societies and find 
that the lowest median value corresponds to foraging societies (0.17) and the largest median to the 
agricultural ones (0.35). For the evolution of evolution of the inequality within each of the groups across 
blocks see the Appendix. 	
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Figure 1. The Neolithic revolution in the lab 
(a) The evolution of the modes of production 
(b) The evolution of inequality 
 
 
Table 3. Summary of action profiles by Block  
 Foraging Societies 
Block I (Rounds 1-20) 
Farming Societies 
Block II (Rounds 21-40) Land quality 
 Frequency Frequency Low High 
AAA (NE) 0.21 0.56 0.16 0.86 
AAB 0.20 0.18 0.26 0.11 
ABB (NE) 0.37 0.18 0.39 0.02 
BBB 0.22 0.08 0.19 0.01 
Gini index 0.05 0.28   
Observations 800 800 345 455 
Notes. For each block, we report the frequency of choices of all groups per round; i.e., we have a total of 40 groups x 20 rounds = 800 
observations in each block. The frequencies can also be interpreted as the percentage of rounds that each group played each of the action 
profiles.  
 
We observe heterogeneity of economic activities in Block I, although modal choice 
corresponds to the Nash equilibrium outcome with social division of labour (ABB) 
which is observed in 37 percent of choices; i.e., on average, foraging groups achieved 
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social division of labour in 37 percent of the rounds, with seven groups that never chose 
the profile ABB and one group that played it all periods (the median value is 40 percent 
and the top quartile chooses ABB in at least 10 rounds). The other three outcomes, 
which include a group of three gatherers (AAA) have a frequency around 21 percent 
each. We observe in Block II a significant drop in the outcome with social division of 
labour from 37% to 18% (Wilcoxon-test, p < 0.001); while there is a clear shift to 
farming activities from 21% to 56% (Wilcoxon-test, p < 0.001). In fact, the modal 
outcome in Block II corresponds to groups of three farmers (AAA) that work in the 
high-quality land, meaning that the successful implementation of agriculture was 
associated to the participation of all the three members of the group choosing the 
farming activity.8  
As for the level of inequality, we find that the Gini index in Block I is significantly 
smaller than in Block II, using the median test (0.053 vs 0.284, p < 0.001) and the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p < 0.001). This, in turn, suggests that groups in Block I 
were more egalitarian than groups in Block II, as earnings were more concentrated in 
one of the members of the group in Block II. In fact, if we look at the member of the 
group who accumulates the most earnings in each block we find that this member 
obtains, on average, 36 percent of the total earnings of the group in Block I and 46 
percent of the total earnings of the group in Block II.9  
 
Result 1. Our experiment replicates the basic features of the evolution of economic 
activities of human societies across history:  
i) Groups in Block I (foraging societies) mostly organized themselves around 
social division of labour. The advent of agricultural revolution caused a 
strong shift towards farming activities in Block II (farming societies) 
																																																						
8 Low-quality land occurs in 43 percent of the choices in Block II (345/800) and this is more evenly 
distributed among all profiles of economic activities, with a prevalence of groups with division of labour 
(39 percent).  
9We can provide further evidence to support the result that there is more inequality in Block II by looking 
at the behaviour of subjects in the redistribution stage. If we examine the transfers received by the lowest 
income subject in the asymmetric profiles where earnings were unequally distributed (ABB and AAB), 
we find the member of the group that decided to gather in ABB in Block I received an average transfer of 
6.68 from the hunters (the median transfer is 5). In Block II, this member received on average 0.64 from 
the hunters (the median transfer is 0). As for the action profile in which one of the members hunts alone 
(AAB), she receives an average transfer of 1.94 from gatherers in Block I, while she receives an average 
transfer of 1.06 from the landowner in Block II. This, in turn, indicates that those members of the group 
who gather (farm) or hunt alone receive less transfers from the rest of the members of the group in the 
farming societies.  See the Appendix for the evolution of the earnings over the rounds.  
12	
	
ii) The level of wealth inequality is higher in Block II than in Block I; i.e., 
foraging societies were more egalitarian than farming societies. 
 
Modes of production and economic inequality 
Our previous findings provide casual evidence to support the idea that the Neolithic 
revolution affected the modes of production and the level of inequality, but they should 
not be understood as conveying a lineal and smooth path from full foraging societies to 
full farming societies, as the standard view typically holds [1]. Rather, there are groups 
that never jumped to farming and many in-between societies that relied both on hunting 
and farming [6, 7, 8]. This heterogeneity is precisely what we observe in our data, as 
displayed in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of groups in Block II by presenting the percentage of 
rounds that each group played the symmetric action profile AAA with high-quality land 
in Block II. The bimodal distribution puts nearly 60% of groups in the extremes of the 
distribution. There are groups (20 percent) that never experienced the agricultural 
revolution. The remaining groups can be split into two categories: short-lasting groups 
(40 percent) and long-lasting groups (40 percent), depending on whether their farming 
experiences in Block II were below or above the median number of rounds (80 percent) 
that groups played the action profile AAA with high-quality land. 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of groups by farming intensity 
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Result 2. There is a heterogeneous transition from Block I to Block II; i.e., while some 
groups never experienced the agricultural revolution, other groups became 
agriculturalists.  
 
Being confident that the experiment captures the basic economic development of 
foraging and farming societies, we next exploit the rich dataset provided by the 
experiment to shed light into the determinants of the success of the adoption of 
agriculture and the evolution of economic inequality across time. 
 
New insights into the effect of the Neolithic revolution on the modes of production 
and the level of inequality 
In this section, we investigate which characteristics of the groups in Block I determined 
the early adoption of the agricultural practices and its success in the long-run. We also 
examine the behaviour of landowners in farming societies during Block II.  
 
Early adoption and success of the agricultural practice 
For each group, we define a measure of the intensity of use of each economic activity 
(as the frequency of rounds each group chose each action profile) and two measures of 
redistribution (given by the average transfers received by the lower payoff member of 
the group in the asymmetric profiles with unequal payoffs, ABB and AAB). 10 We also 
define the legitimacy of the landowner as difference between the number of rounds that 
this member chose action A in Block I, compared with the two other members of the 
group. We use these variables to predict the adoption and success of agriculture in 
Block II. Our analysis includes controls for the average level of trust and the average 
degree of risk aversion of the members of the group (Table 4).  
To capture the early adoption of agriculture, we run logit analysis in regressions (1) to 
(4). First, the dependent variable in regressions (1) or (2) is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if all members of the group decided to farm in round 21, which is the first 
round of Block II. Regressions (3) and (4) replicate the analysis for groups that 
																																																						
10 The intensity of the profile AAA is the omitted variable. We do not consider transfers in the symmetric 
profiles AAA or BBB because they lead an equal distribution of payoffs.  
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implemented the agricultural practice in the short-run (i.e., the dependent variable takes 
the value 1 if all members of the group were farming in a high-quality land in rounds 22 
or 23). Regressions (5) to (8) look at the success of the agricultural practices in the long-
run. We use a Tobit model in regressions (5) and (6) to predict the number of rounds 
that each group implemented the high-quality land with the three members of the group 
farming. Regressions (7) and (8) use a logit model to predict whether this outcome 
profile was observed in the last round of the experiment (round 40).11 
Table 4. Determinants of early adoption and long-term success of agriculture in Block II 
 Short-term (Early adoption of agriculture) Long-term (Success of agriculture) 
 Logit: Round 21 Logit: Round 22 or 23 Tobit: Number rounds Logit: Round 40 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Constant -6.503 -7.786 -22.12* -20.68* 33.30*** 30.13*** -1.840 -1.353 
 (10.36) (10.73) (13.04) (10.91) (8.326) (7.533) (5.609) (7.047) 
IntensityAAB 2.073 4.910 14.48 13.28 9.271 5.617 3.467 1.711 
 (11.80) (13.18) (11.90) (10.12) (19.75) (20.15) (7.283) (9.818) 
IntensityABB -0.955 1.341 6.239 7.732 -4.863 -0.542 -3.632 -2.707 
 (8.727) (8.427) (5.773) (5.965) (15.94) (16.01) (5.101) (5.918) 
IntensityBBB -1.721 -1.411 16.99 13.81 26.30 19.11 8.529 5.859 
 (9.094) (10.10) (14.13) (11.44) (16.47) (16.41) (5.946) (7.371) 
Redistribution ABB 0.297** 0.367*** 0.438*** 0.488** 0.520** 0.725** -0.0631 0.030 
 (0.140) (0.121) (0.156) (0.191) (0.251) (0.267) (0.095) (0.095) 
Redistribution AAB -0.155 -0.270 -0.324 -0.522 -0.123 -0.739 0.0472 -0.221 
 (0.251) (0.302) (0.275) (0.454) (0.543) (0.621) (0.376) (0.423) 
Legitimacy -0.0733 -0.0933 0.411 0.331 0.731** 0.674** 0.351** 0.357* 
 (0.223) (0.207) (0.342) (0.324) (0.332) (0.318) (0.164) (0.186) 
         
Controls (risk, trust) No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Observations 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The regressions in Table 4 show that the only variable that affects the early adoption of 
agriculture is how redistributive groups were when they coordinated on social division 
of labour. No other shared norm developed in the group in Block I matters. For the 
long-term success of agriculture, models (5) and (6) in Table 4 indicate that the 
legitimacy of the land-owner is also important to determine the number of rounds that 
each group chose the farming activity in Block II; in fact, this is the only significant 
independent variable when we look at the likelihood of choosing the farming activity in 
the long-term (round 40).  
 
																																																						
11 The results are robust if we consider farming groups in the high-quality land in the last two rounds of 
the experiment (rounds 39 and 40).	
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Result 3. The more egalitarian a foraging group is in the social division of labour, the 
more prone the group is to an early adoption of agriculture. The legitimacy of the 
landowner-to-be in the pre-agricultural era is key to determine the long-term success of 
agriculture.  
 
Hierarchy and raising inequality over time 
To study the evolution of inequality in Block II, Table 5 reports the average earnings of 
landowners and the transfers to each peasant in each group, with groups being 
characterized by the number of rounds they farmed in the high-quality land.  
To understand what these figures mean, it is useful to recall that although the 
experimental design did not allow peasants to contest land ownership and the earnings 
from farming, they have a powerful tool for offsetting any “excess of power” by the 
landowner: they could decide to stop farming the land and receiving a payoff of 50 each 
by engaging in the alternative economic activity (hunting), leaving the landowner with a 
payoff of 20. So, 50 is what in technical terms is called the reservation earnings 
associated to the outside option. Outside meaning “outside from agriculture”. 
 
Table 5. Distribution of groups in Block II by farming experience  
  
Rounds 
#Groups 
(Frequency) 
Earnings 
of 
landowner 
Transfers 
to each 
peasant 
Likelihood 
investment 
No agricultural experience 0  8 (0.20)    
Short-lasting experiences 1-14 16 (0.40) 259.20 57.20 0.91 
      Ephemeral groups 1-5 7 (0.17) 314.76 33.33  
      Other groups  6-15 9 (0.22) 215.99 75.76  
Long-lasting experiences 15-19 16 (0.40) 165.14 99.79 0.96 
      Hierarchical groups 15-19 8 (0.20) 198.71 82.84  
      Egalitarian groups 16-19 8 (0.20)  131.59 116.74  
 N 40    
 
We observe that groups with short-lasting experiences are characterized by landowners 
keeping a high proportion of the surplus (259.20) and transferring to each peasant an 
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amount (57.20) that barely exceeds the outside option. In this category, we can identify 
7 groups that had very ephemeral experiences (less than 5 rounds). In these groups, the 
transfer to each peasant (33.33) was short of their reservation earnings and as a result, 
peasants decided not to farm after a few rounds.12 In groups with long-lasting 
experiences (more than 15 rounds) the landowner kept on average 165.14 and 
transferred 99.79 to each peasant. We can also identify differences in the behaviour of 
landowners in these groups. There are 8 groups in which landowners were highly 
egalitarian (e.g., they kept roughly 120 for most of the rounds), while there are 8 groups 
in which landowners were more unequal (e.g., they kept on average 198.71 and 
transferred 82.84 to each peasant). Importantly, the experience of these groups does not 
seem to vary significantly; e.g., the average number of rounds that the egalitarian 
(unequal) groups experienced the high-quality land with the three members choosing 
the farming activity is 18 (17.28), respectively (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.39).13 
Overall, these findings suggest that agriculturalist groups in which the landowner 
demands a very high amount (especially in the first rounds) are doomed to fail, but 
agriculture can be sustained in the long-run (especially in groups where the legitimacy 
of the landowner is high), even if landowners do not implement an equal distribution of 
earnings. Hence, we observe in the lab how the evolution of agriculturalist societies 
leads to the evolution of different shared norms or institutions, in line with the idea that 
different populations can converge to different norms [28]. 
To see the dynamics of long-lasting agriculturalist groups, Figure 3 displays the 
earnings of the landowner across rounds. We observe that landowners in egalitarian 
groups divide the earnings equally across rounds. In hierarchical groups though, 
landowners keep on average 150 in the first rounds; i.e., they transfer to each peasant 
around 150, an amount that prevents them from choosing the outside option in the next 
round. However, landowners increase their demand across rounds and end up asking for 
more than half of the total earnings (200 out of 360) from rounds 36 to 39.  A regression 
analysis using OLS for the earnings of landowners in long-lasting agriculturalist groups 
																																																						
12	For the other 9 groups that had short-lasting experiences (7-14 rounds) the average earnings of the 
landowner are 215.99 and the average transfer to peasants is 75.76. These groups had on average 10 
rounds of experience with the agricultural activity.	
13 These groups have also similar experiences regarding the number of consecutive rounds that each group 
was in the high-quality land with the three members of the group farming, as the average length of 
consecutive rounds is 8.47 (9.86) for the egalitarian (hierarchical) groups, respectively 
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in Block II confirms that the variable Round is positive and significant for long-lasting 
unequal groups (p = 0.044) but not for long-lasting egalitarian groups (p = 0.175).14 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of earnings of landowners in long-lasting agriculturalist groups in 
Block II.   
 
Result 4. In long-lasting agriculturalist groups, there is a tendency for landowners to 
relentless increase the appropriation of the agricultural surplus across rounds. 
 
Robustness  
We conducted an additional treatment with 20 groups (n = 60 participants) to check the 
robustness of our previous findings. We were particularly interested in testing whether 
the shift towards the farming activity occurs even if we facilitated the asymmetric 
equilibrium with division of labour (ABB). Thus, we decided to force the landowner to 
farm during Block II so as to prevent any miscoordination problem in efficiency-
seeking groups that ended up choosing the BBB outcome (instead of ABB). This feature 
of our design should also create incentives for the landowner to be more egalitarian 
during Block II, as peasants have an evident outside option (hunting) that pays them 50, 
and their coordination is easy -in fact, the landowner cannot punish them by hunting as 
well.  
																																																						
14 We exclude the last-round from the analysis as landowners kept most of the surplus from the 
agricultural practice in this round. Our analysis is robust when we include controls for age, gender, risk 
attitudes and trust as regressors.  
	
10
0
12
0
14
0
16
0
18
0
20
0
22
0
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
Round
Hierarchical groups Egalitarian groups
Long-lasting groups
18	
	
Appendix A summarizes the main results of this treatment, where we observe a shift to 
farming activities in Block II from 15% to 47% (p < 0.001). Groups are also 
heterogeneous in their transition from foraging to farming societies. There are 7 groups 
that never experienced the agricultural experience in Block II. There are 3 groups that 
had very ephemeral experiences (only 1 round), while the remaining 10 groups had 
long-lasting experience with a minimum (maximum) number of rounds of 12 (19) 
rounds farming in a high-quality land, respectively (Median number of rounds = 17). In 
these groups, we can also distinguish between egalitarian landowners (5 groups) and 
hierarchical land-owners (5 groups), depending on whether or not they divided the 
earnings from landing equally among the members of the group. Interestingly enough, a 
regression analysis using OLS confirms that landowners in hierarchical groups exhibit a 
tendency towards increasing the appropriation of the agricultural surplus across rounds 
(p = 0.013). These results contribute to the fact that we also observe more inequality in 
Block II than in Block I in this treatment, as measured by the (median) Gini index 
(0.088 vs 0.171, p = 0.019).  
 
Conclusions 
This research applies the experimental methodology developed in the field of 
economics to the study of the Neolithic agricultural revolution. Game theory combined 
with experiments allow the experimenter to observe how a group of individuals, making 
choices about economic activities and sharing behaviour, evolves as new technologies 
are available and how the adoption of the new technologies affect their economic 
choices and their norms of sharing. 
The experimental data replicate some stylized fact of foraging societies –egalitarian 
groups characterized by social division of labour- and farming societies -intensive use 
of land and less egalitarian than foraging societies. But the data add as well to the 
archaeological literature on how the institutions developed in a foraging group affect 
their transition to farming and that transition to farming is heterogeneous. We find that 
more egalitarian groups under social division of labour are more prone to an early 
adoption of agriculture and that the long-term success of an agriculturalist group is 
determined by the legitimacy of the landowner. The mechanism would be as follows: 
the higher the legitimacy of the landowner, the less that peasants dispute his decisions 
on the redistribution of earnings from farming. In our game, peasants could not directly 
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challenge the property right over the land, but they could easily deactivate it by 
engaging in the alternative activity: hunting. Land is a valuable asset only when the 
joint effort of the three group members. It seems that the evolution of respect for land 
property rights is a prerequisite for the long-term success of agriculture. This is in line 
with the results in [22] about the co-evolution of agriculture and property rights. Once 
agricultural practices were the norm, landowners started to reap off the benefits from 
farming little by little, raising the inequality in agriculturalist societies.  
There are many ways in which the experimental design can be expanded. We believe 
that our results would be more even more pronounced if we allowed for hunting to 
disappear after groups devoted a few rounds to farming activities. This would align with 
the idea that intensive farming practices destroy the habitat for wild plants and animals, 
thereby affecting the possibility to hunt again [27]. There are other features that could 
be incorporated in our design as well. For example, communication can facilitate 
coordination [51] or provide information about the norms or rules (see [38] and 
references therein). This is left for future research. 
We find appealing to conclude this paper by claiming that the success of agriculture was 
“mandatory” during the Holocene, not (only) because of climate reasons,15 but because 
anthropological and archaeological studies reveal that foraging societies had the feature 
that our experiment has isolated as the key determinant of the quick adoption of 
agriculture: they were egalitarian groups. It is ironic that equality was the origin of the 
raise of inequality. 
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APPENDIX A.  
A.1. The equilibrium nature of the games.  
The “hunt-gather” game in Block I is a coordination game, with two classes of Nash 
equilibria, AAA and ABB. Can we say something about the transition probabilities 
among the different action profiles within groups? Can these transition probabilities 
reflect the equilibrium structure of the game? The following table reports the likelihood 
of observing a action profile in round t depending on the action profile chosen by the 
group in a previous round t-1, for foraging societies.  
 
Table A1. Transition probabilities for foraging societies 
 AAA(t) AAB(t) ABB(t) BBB(t) 
AAA (t-1) 40.00 23.03 22.42 14.55 
AAB (t-1) 21.79 22.44 35.90 19.87 
ABB (t-1) 12.10 16.01 43.77 28.11 
BBB (t-1) 14.61 16.85 42.70 25.84 
 
In foraging societies, we find that a group with three gatherers in a particular round 
AAA(t-1) have a likelihood of 40% to be a group with three gatherers in the subsequent 
round AAA(t), while groups with division of labour in a round ABB(t-1) have a 
likelihood of 43.77% of being in the same profile in the subsequent round ABB(t).  
Table A2 displays econometric estimations of logit models with errors clustered at the 
group level for foraging societies. The dependent variables are dummies for the 
different action profiles (e.g. AAA(t) takes value 1 if the group has chosen action profile 
AAA in round t and 0 otherwise). The set of the independent variables include the 
Round and dummies for the action profile dummies of the group in the previous round. 
 
Table A2. Econometric estimation of the transition probabilities among action profiles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable AAA(t) AAB(t) ABB(t) BBB(t) 
AAA (t-1) 0.150 -0.932 1.337 13.69*** 
 (0.684) (0.580) (1.078) (0.495) 
AAB (t-1) -0.708 -1.139** 2.088** 14.10*** 
 (0.496) (0.505) (1.005) (0.365) 
ABB (t-1) -1.434*** -1.310** 2.301** 14.51*** 
 (0.513) (0.581) (0.963) (0.336) 
BBB (t-1) -1.217** -1.244** 2.260** 14.40*** 
 (0.522) (0.546) (0.962) (0.365) 
Round 0.007 -0.076*** 0.037** 0.012 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constant -0.626 0.482 -2.981*** -15.59*** 
 (0.473) (0.457) (1.041) (0.238) 
Observations 800 800 800 800 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note that all estimates for models (3) and (4) are positive while all estimates for models 
(1) and (2) are negative. The only exception is the positive estimate of the variable 
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AAB(t-1) on AAA(t), reflecting the equilibrium nature of the profile AAA (but it is not 
powerful enough to be significant). This reveals an attraction towards action profiles 
with large number of hunters (ABB and BBB). However, coordination problems are 
evident as all estimates for model (4) are positive and highly significant. Still, we can 
see the equilibrium nature of ABB from the estimates of model (3), where the only 
significant estimate is actually the lagged variable ABB. Even more, groups learn to 
coordinate on this efficient class of Nash equilibria as times passes, as is evidenced by 
the positive and significant estimate of the variable period in model (3). The only other 
occasion in which the variable period is significant is in model (2). In this case, it is 
negative. 
We do not perform this analysis for farming societies, because the action profile in a 
particular period depends not only on the action profile in the previous one but also on 
the quality of the land, as it is shown in our analysis in the main text. At any event, 
Table A3 replicates the analysis in Table A1 for farming societies.  
 
Table A3. Transition probabilities for farming societies 
 AAA(t) AAB(t) ABB(t) BBB(t) 
AAA (t-1) 61.10 17.39 13.73 7.78 
AAB (t-1) 57.35 22.06 15.44 5.15 
ABB (t-1) 45.77 13.38 27.46 13.38 
BBB (t-1) 41.54 16-92 18.33 8.72 
 
It can be seen that the “agricultural equilibria” (AAA) has a high degree of attraction.   
 
A.2. The determinants of choosing “gather”. Table A4 reports econometric 
estimation of a logit model where the dependent variable is the dummy “gathering” that 
takes value 1 if the experimental subject has chosen action A in a period and 0 
otherwise and the independent variables are the period, some sociodemographic 
variables, such as age, female gender and risk aversion. In one specification, we add 
some control variables as the action profile in the previous round. 
 
Table A.4. Probability of choosing action A “gathering” at round t 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Gathering at round t Gathering at round t 
Female 0.146 0.090 
 (0.225) (0.217) 
Risk 0.161*** 0.155*** 
 (0.056) (0.056) 
Age -0.018 -0.010 
 (0.012) (0.011) 
AAA (t-1)  -0.245 
  (0.530) 
AAB (t-1)  -0.761** 
  (0.340) 
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ABB (t-1)  -1.171*** 
  (0.315) 
BBB (t-1)  -1.094*** 
  (0.312) 
Round -0.030*** -0.018* 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant -0.285 0.339 
 (0.413) (0.491) 
Observations 2,400 2,400 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Errors clustered at the 
group level 
 
The presence of the control variables does not have a huge impact on the estimates. The 
estimate for the variable Female is positive but not significant, showing that females do 
not choose A significantly more often than males. We find a significant effect of risk 
aversion on the probability of choosing A: the more risk averse a subject is, the higher is 
the probability of choosing A. This effect is consistent with the description of the two 
actions in the game, as action B is riskier than action A. 
 
A.3. Evolution of earnings in the “hunt-gather” game in the asymmetric profiles. 
Panel A of Figure 1A presents the evolution over rounds of the average payoffs per 
round (after the redistribution stage) of gatherers (A) and hunters (B) when the group 
chose the action profile AAB. This figure includes two horizontal lines at 0 and 20 
corresponding to the final payoffs in the absence of any transfer. The evolution of the 
average payoffs after the redistribution stage when the group chose the action profile 
with division of labour (ABB) is presented in Panel B of Figure 1A. This figure 
includes two horizontal lines at 20 and 50 corresponding to the final payoffs in the 
absence of any transfer and one additional horizontal line at 40, corresponding to full 
redistribution 
 
Figure 1A. Evolution of earnings in the “hunt-gather” game in the asymmetric profiles.  
 
a) Evolution of earnings in groups that choose the profile AAB 
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b) Evolution of earnings in groups that choose the profile ABB 
 
 
The bottom panel of Figure 1A shows that there is an increasing redistributive effort 
with a peak at round 10, where groups were on average redistributing half of total 
earnings (average payoffs 30-45-45, with an associated Gini Index 0.125) and then a 
drop in the second part of the block. At any even, gatherer receives on average positive 
transfers from hunters. As reported in the main text, this is in contrast to the observed 
behaviour in Block II.  
 
A.4. The evolution of inequality within groups 
 
Figure 2A presents the Gini index of each group in each block of the experiment.  
Overall, we observe a tendency to increase the level of inequality within groups. In 
particular there are 32 out of 40 groups (80 percent) that exhibits more inequality (i.e., a 
higher Gini index) in Block II than in Block I, while the remaining 8 groups (20 
percent) exhibit more inequality in Block I than in Block II.  The Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test provides evidence that the level of inequality is higher in Block II (p < 0.001). 
 
Figure 2A. Gini index in each block of the experiment (within groups).  
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A.5. Robustness check  
Here we present the results of our additional treatment in which the landowner is forced 
to farm in Block II, so that BBB is not a possible outcome in Block II. Figure 3A 
presents the evolution of the modes of production and the level of inequality, as 
measured by the Gini index. Figure 4A shows the distribution of groups by farming 
intensity in Block II; i.e., we depict the percentage of rounds each group decided to farm 
(AAA) in a high-quality land. Finally, Figure 5A presents the earnings of landowners 
across rounds in hierarchical groups that had long-lasting experiences with agriculture 
(more than 60 percent of rounds). We do not depict the earnings in the last round of the 
experiment in which landowners kept most of the surplus from agricultural practices.  
 
Figure 3A. The evolution of the modes of production (upper panel) and the level of 
inequality (bottom panel) in our additional treatment.   
 
 (a) The evolution of the modes of production 
 
(b) The evolution of inequality 
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Figure 4A. Distribution of groups by farming intensity 
 
 
 
Figure 5A. Evolution of earnings of landowners in long-lasting agriculturalist groups in 
Block II.  
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APPENDIX B – EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Welcome to the experiment 
This is an experiment to study how individuals make decisions. We are only interested in average behaviour, so no 
particular behaviour is expected from you. Your decisions, however, will influence your earnings, as we will explain 
below. For any questions that may arise during the experiment, we ask you to raise your hand and you will be 
attended by a member of the lab staff. Other than this, any type of communication between you is prohibited. 
 
This experiment consists of two phases. Below we explain the instructions of the first phase. 
 
Instructions for Phase 1 
 
This phase consists of 20 rounds. At the beginning, we are going to match you randomly with two other 
subjects in this room to form a group of three people, which will be maintained throughout the 
experiment. In this first phase, each member of the group must choose between action A or action B. The 
points generated by each action depend on the number of members who have chosen it. The next table 
displays the provisional points generated and how many points correspond to each member of the group: 
 
 
Action 
Number of subjects in the 
group choosing the action 
Provisional points 
generated by the action 
Provisional points allocated to 
each subject choosing the action 
A 
1 20 20 
2 40 20 
3 60 20 
B 
1 0 0 
2 100 50 
3 30 10 
 
As you see, action A will generate 20, 40 or 60 provisional points depending on whether 1, 2 or 3 
members of your group choose it. These points will be divided among those who choose Action A, so 
choosing Action A will give you 20 points, regardless of how many people in your group have chosen 
Action A. If you choose Action B, your payment will depend on how many people have chosen action B. 
As indicated in the table, you will receive 0 points if you are the only person in the group who has chosen 
action B. If you and another person choose action B, 100 points will be generated, so that each one will 
receive 50 points. Finally, if the three members of the group choose Action B, 30 points will be generated 
and each of you will receive 10 points. 
 
As we have said previously, these are provisional points. To determine the final points (which will be 
important to the final payment for this experiment), we will allow group members to make point transfers. 
 
 
What happens during the transfer phase? 
 
After choosing your actions, we will announce how many group members have chosen actions A and B, 
and the provisional points allocated to each member. Once you know the allocation of the provisional 
points, you can transfer points to other members (if you want). Each point you transfer will be deducted 
from your provisional points and will be added to the points of the member to whom you send them. In 
this transfer phase, you could also receive points from other members of your group. 
 
At the end of each round, we will again inform you of each member's actions and announce the transfers 
that have taken place, so that you will know what your final points of the round are. A table containing 
information on actions and final points will be available at the end of each round. Remember that this first 
phase will last 20 rounds and we will keep the group constant. 
 
How many points will I earn by participating in this phase? 
 
When the experiment ends, we will randomly choose a round from this phase and pay you based on the 
final points you have earned in the chosen round. To determine the final payment, we will convert the 
points into Euros (10 points = 1 Euro). 
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Phase 2 Instructions 
 
This phase consists of a total of 20 rounds, during which you will be matched with the same subjects as in 
the previous phase; that is, the composition of your group does not change. In this second phase, the 
members of the group will be of two possible types: types I, and types II. Both types can choose, as in the 
previous phase, between actions A and B. In each group, there will be one type I member and two type II 
members. The member of the group that is type I is the one that chose action A the most times in the 
previous phase. 
 
As in the previous phase, the provisional points generated by each action depend on the number of group 
members who have chosen it, as shown in the following table: 
 
 
Action 
Number of subjects 
in the group 
choosing the action 
Provisional points generated 
by the action 
Provisional points allocated to 
each subject choosing the 
action Low level High level 
A 
1 20 40 All provisional points from 
action A will be allocated to 
Type I member 
2 70 240 
3 120 480 
B 
1 0 0 
2 100 50 
3 30 10 
 
The provisional points generated by action B are obtained in a similar way to the previous phase. If only 
one subject has chosen action B, that person will receive 0 provisional points. If two subjects have chosen 
Action B, each will receive 50 points. If all three group members have chosen Action B, they will each 
receive 10 points. 
 
The provisional points associated with option A are now different from what happened in the previous 
phase in two aspects: First, the points will depend not only on how many members of the group have 
chosen option A but also on something we will call “level " (High or low). In addition, the type I member 
will be the one who receives the provisional points generated by action A. This member may, however, 
transfer points to other members of the group during the transfer phase. We explain this in more detail. 
 
Firstly, the provisional points generated depend on the level and number of subjects who choose action A. 
 
• If the level is LOW: If only one subject chooses option A, 20 provisional points will be 
generated. If two members choose action A, a total of 70 provisional points will be generated. If 
action A is chosen by the three members of the group, then a total of 120 provisional points will 
be generated. 
• If the level is HIGH: If only one subject chooses option A, 40 provisional points will be 
generated. The total provisional points will be 240 points (if two subjects choose action A) and 
480 points (if three subjects choose action A). 
 
In all cases, the type I member will be the one who receives the provisional points generated by action A. 
 
 
How is the level determined (HIGH or LOW)? 
 
At the beginning of this phase, your group will be at the LOW level, so choosing Action A can result in 
20, 70 or 120 points depending on how many members of the group choose it. If the provisional points 
generated by action A in a given round reach 120 points, the type I member can pay 120 points to switch 
the level to HIGH. If the Type I member decides to do so, then no member of the group will receive 
provisional points that round, but the group will be at the HIGH level in the next round. This means that 
action A would generate 40, 240 or 480 provisional points in the next round, depending on how many 
members of the group choose action A. If the group reaches the HIGH level in a round, then 120 points 
must be used to maintain this level in the next round. Otherwise, the level return to LOW next round. In 
all cases, it will be the type I member who decides if he wants to switch or keep the level. Once this 
decision has been made, the transfer phase will take place. 
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What happens during the transfer phase? 
 
After choosing the actions, we will announce how many group members have chosen actions A and B, 
and what the provisional points are for each member. Remember that action A will generate a number of 
provisional points that will be assigned to the type I member, while action type B will generate 
provisional points for those members who choose it. 
 
If action A has generated at least 120 provisional points in a round, then we will ask the type I member to 
also choose if he wants to change the level (if he is at the LOW level) or keep the same level (if he is at 
the HIGH level). Once this decision has been made, all the members of the group will know what the 
provisional points are and they will be able to transfer points, as was the case in the previous phase. Each 
point you transfer will be deducted from your provisional points and will be added to the points of the 
member to whom you send them. In this transfer phase, you could also receive points from other 
members of your group. This transfer phase will determine what each member's final points are. 
 
At the end of each round, we will tell you each member's actions and announce the transfers that have 
taken place, so that you will know what your round's points are. A table containing information on actions 
and points will be available at the end of each round. Remember that this second phase will last 20 rounds 
and we will keep the group constant. 
 
 
How much will I earn by participating in this phase? 
 
When the experiment ends, we will randomly choose a round from this phase and pay you based on the 
points you have earned in the chosen round. To determine the final payment, we will cash the points into 
Euros (10 points = 1 Euro). 
